Should the interpretation of law be
It may be accepted that that proposition is particularly salutary when the enactment is said to derogate from fundamental rights or damage fundamental interests. Indeed, there is no such thing as a self-interpreting provision.
Singular prescriptive sentences concern individual acts of textual interpretation.
Need for interpretation of statutes
In these cases the federal law is held to be paramount. In approving the Court of Appeal's answer to their arguments, his Honour held that: whatever the temporal operation of the companion rule might be, the IBAC Act manifests an unmistakable legislative intention that a person summoned and examined might be a person whose corrupt conduct or criminal police personnel misconduct is the subject-matter of the investigation. The appellants' sole ground of appeal was that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to hold that Pt 6 of the Act did not authorise an examination, where there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the examinee may be guilty of an offence. These are: 1 empirical truth, 2 pragmatic truth, and 3 systemic truth. So, in the views of some jurists and legal philosophers, interpretive sentences and integration sentences are truth-apt entities. Their Honours said: '[J]udicial findings as to legislative intention' were 'an expression of the constitutional relationship between arms of government with a respect of the making, interpretation and application of laws'. These canons reflect an understanding that the judiciary is not the only branch of government entrusted with constitutional responsibility. The starting point is that rights are interfered with by Parliament. But that purpose is not to be identified by making an a priori assumption that the Pawnbrokers Act was intended to reach all of the transactions just identified. And there are a multitude of forces to be found in solving a legal problem other than logic; such as tradition, history, sociology and morality. In the same way, a lawyer or court cannot determine the meaning of words by any strict logical or scientific approach; if, for no other reason than the lawyer speaks in a language that has all the uncertainties of english expression. The first subcategory of incomplete rules was best articulated by HLA Hart who argued that legislatures cannot foresee all possible circumstances or cases that a statute will encounter.
Indeed, there may be no single legislative "intent" other than the literal text that was enacted by the legislature, because different legislators may have different views about the meaning of an enacted statute.
The Founding Fathers had wisely worded that document in rather general terms leaving it open to future elaboration to meet changing conditions. All of the above methods may seem reasonable: It may be considered undemocratic[ citation needed ] to ignore the literal text, because only that text was passed through democratic processes.
Chief Justice Marshall expressed the challenge which the Supreme Court faces in maintaining free government by noting: "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding. Of course, the judge's task, essentially filling out the legislative will to apply to a particular situation, is absolutely necessary to make statutes workable.
So for instance in Dutch law, no general priority sequence for the above methods is recognized. Therefore, it is important to remember that the words and concepts in the law are often replete with history.
Object of interpretation of statutes
Thus, lawyers have been more and more engaged in this process as the statutory laws become more complex. Finally, turning to the outcomes of the activities of textual and metatextual interpretation, surely they are apt neither for empirical truth nor for experimental truth. The Charming Betsy , 6 U. Undoubtedly, there is a need for readily understandable and consistent principles to guide the interpretation of legislation. Textual[ edit ] Textual canons are rules of thumb for understanding the words of the text. See Murray v. As Chief Justice Gleeson pointed out in Legislation and the common law are not separate and independent sources of law; the one the concern of parliaments, and the other the concern of courts. Current approaches largely fall into two broad camps. Some states such as the United States are not a parties to the treaty, but recognize that the Convention is, at least in part, merely a codification of customary international law. They accordingly seem to have in mind the outputs of practically oriented activities of interpretation in a proper sense, in the textual and meta-textual varieties. Santos Such an interpretation would require that the ACMA's enforcement against a licence breach always be subject to a the appropriate authority choosing to prosecute the offence, and b the entry of a subsequent conviction for that offence. Legislation often involves compromise. This is not the place to discuss the application of the principle of legality one of the assumptions by various current members of the High Court of Australia — there would appear to be a difference in, at least, emphasis as to when clearly identified legislative purposes result in affecting certain rights and freedoms.
based on 86 review